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A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF TWO NOTIONS OF 'DECISION MAKING'

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend
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for the degree of Master of Arts.

ABSTRACT

John L. Austin and Harald Ofstad are two philosophers
with a standing of some prominence within the general tradition
of analytically oriented modern philosophy (vide: Bibliography,
pp. 77, 78). However, while Austin was known as one of the main
figures in the so-called "ordinary language" or "linguistic"
approach to analysis, Ofstad adheres to the more empirically
oriented trend of Scandinavian philosophy of language (vide:
Arne Naess:

In the present thesis I try to expound these two under-
currents in analytical philosophy as they manifest themselves
in Austin's and Ofstad's different attempts to analyse and/or
explicate 'decision' or 'decision making'.

The comparison proved, already at the outset, to be
hampered by various factors:

Austin was never quite specifically concerned with the
use(s) of "decision" or the concept(s) of 'decision (making)'.
His position can only be established on grounds of his general
doctrine of illocutionary forces. A presentation of this doc-
trine seems to necessitate, if only in a vague and preliminary

way, an introduction to Austin's whole laborious, conceptual apparatus, with its numerous subtle distinctions--the clarity and significance of which are not always entirely obvious. The attempt at a _pons asinorum_ to the language of Austinian neo-logisms takes up a major part of Chapter III.

Ofstad, on the other hand, deals directly with 'decision', its concept(s) or use(s). Unfortunately, no convincing clues are offered to indicate what Ofstad's main concern is, when he is dealing with 'decision' or "decision", etc. Is his claim a _descriptive_ one, based on (a) conceptual analyses, (b) empirio-semantical investigations, or (c) some sort of psycho-analyses? Or is he more concerned with a normative, _prescriptive_ aspect, e.g., with linguistic (or even psychological? or ethical?) legislations or recommendations?

In any event, I am bound to confess that I have not found a way to interpret Ofstad's contributions (analyses, enquiries or explications), which would not also render his efforts (however they be classified) rather unsuccessful. I find it particularly difficult to make sense of his 'decision _per se_', introduced as "an action" to be dichotomized as "successful"/"unsuccessful", etc.

It will be understood from this, I suppose, that there is a considerable amount of critical evaluation in the chapter (II)

on Ofstad. The reason why this is to a lesser extent the case in the Austin chapter is explained in a previous paragraph. It should <u>not</u> be interpreted to imply that this author is more prone to concord with Austin's than with Ofstad's position-- if these positions are indeed just <u>two</u> positions, and comparable on the same level, as it were, so as to permit one to <u>lean</u> towards one of them, rather than towards the other.

It is nevertheless safe to say that it is from my attempt to expound Austin's doctrine of illocutionary forces, that I elicit a notion of 'decision (-making)' which roughly parallels the notion I am most inclined to entertain in the following first two chapters. I find that Austin may most plausibly be interpreted to distinguish 'decision' and 'judgment'. Only the latter is, according to Austin, to be classified as "right" or "wrong", "justifiable" or "unjustifiable". It is not entirely impossible that Ofstad, with his 'decision <u>per se</u>', at least occasionally, has intended to convey something in the direction of Austin's 'judgment'. There is only one major obstacle to such an interpretation: Austin tends to conceive of "judgment" as an "achievement" or a "success" word, i.e., like the words "winning" or "losing", whereas Ofstad, unfortunately, seems to want to permit his 'decision <u>per se</u>' to have duration (as any other 'action'), a conceptual characteristic which would <u>per defini-
tionem</u> prevent its subsumption under 'success (or achievement) words'.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am greatly indebted to Professor Herman Tennessen, my supervisor, for the continual advice and criticisms he offered. Professor Tennessen has greatly stimulated my interest in Philosophy in general, and my interest in this particular area of Philosophy.

I also wish to acknowledge Professor Max Wright who has offered excellent suggestions both as to style and philosophic content of this thesis.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1. Purpose of Inquiry.

The purpose of this thesis is not so much to elucidate the notions of decision-making as to write an exposition of two major philosophers' enquiries into 'decision-making.' I shall attempt to give an account of the two philosophers' approach to the problem, as well as to discuss the compatibility of their views. I have chosen Harold Ofstad, not the least because of the overwhelmingly enthusiastic reviews of his book "An Inquiry Into the Freedom of Decision." One such report is by Anders Wedberg:[1]

> Ofstad's study of freedom is without doubt
> the best and most exhaustive which has so far
> been presented on the subject. When they use
> the word "freedom," such scholars as Epicurus,
> Chrysippus, Augustine, Spinoza, Hume, Kant,
> Bergson, and Schrödinger, etc., are all in
> some degree semantically unconscious in compar-
> ison with Ofstad's unlimited heed to nuance.[2]

In Ofstad's work the main emphasis is on the concept of the 'power of the freedom,' or the 'free will' problem. Only in a minor way is he interested in a notion of 'decision-making.' He

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[1]See back cover of Inquiry, Number Three, Autumn 1963, Volume 6.

[2]Ibid.

does devote a considerable part of his work towards a conception of 'decisions.' It will be these notions that will mainly concern me in this thesis.

I have chosen the works of the late John Austin, because of his prominence in the field of analytic philosophy. I think it is at least fair to say he makes a worth while contribution towards a concept of 'decision-making.'

An attempt will be made to expound each philosopher's con- cept of decision-making with criticisms that seem necessary. Finally some sort of a comparative analysis will be made in an attempt to show similarities or differences between the two philo- sophers. In the case of John Austin some effort will be spent in the explanation of basic terminology and distinctions as most of his terminology he has invented for his specific purposes. It would be difficult to discuss his ideas, so an exposition of Austin's terms will be attempted. It is hoped that a justified relationship can be drawn between the exposition of terms and Austin's notion of decision-making. The exposition of Austin and his concept of decision-making is in Chapter Three.

I shall expound Harald Ofstad's notions on decision-making in Chapter Two. This chapter precedes the one on Austin because Ofstad's terminology is more directly connected with the concept of decision-making than that of Austin. In Ofstad's book An Inquiry Into the Freedom of Decision, there is a specific section that deals with decision-making; there is no such specific discussion in Austin.

1.1 Basic Terminology

As might be expected the two philosophers use different terminology. For this reason I wish to introduce some basic terminology which is very close to Ofstad's terminology and, I hope, easily adaptable to John Austin's language. There appear to be three distinct areas that may be discussed in connection with decisions. There are: (1) a pre-decisional process; this includes deliberation on alternatives, judgment making, argumentative discourse, etc., (2) the decision per se, which is the decision itself or the result of the pre-decisional process, and (3) a post-decisional process, which is the following out of one's intentions, doing some physical action (perhaps this is a contingent factor), or in general the doing of something.

I claim that decisions per se are not, without enormous difficulties, to be conceived as actions, hence they are not to be conceived of as having duration or being repeatable. I wish to draw an analogy between the word "decide" and obvious "success" words like "recognize" and "win." For example, the "playing" of a game is a process, but the winning of a game is just that: winning. There is no duration involved. It would invariably make sense to ask an agent to repeat something that had duration. It may be practically difficult but it is never logically difficult. Take "winning": it would seem exceedingly odd if the winner of a game were asked by a spectator to do the "winning" over again so he might get a picture of it. · ·

My contention is that the words "winning" and "deciding" (decision _per se_) are both achievement words. It is hard to imagine what an agent would make of the request to repeat a decision _per se_. He may repeat part of, or all of the argumentative discourse which, according to Ofstad, comes before the decision itself; but surely the agent would be at a loss if asked to repeat nothing but just that: "decision itself". What I am trying to say is that there are logical difficulties in considering decisions _per se_ as a subclass of actions.

I have also said that the decision _per se_ may be seen as the result of the deliberation or pre-decisional process. It is only the result in the sense that the winning of a game is the result of the playing of a game. A necessary (but not sufficient) condition for the decision _per se_ is then the pre-decisional process.

There may or may not be a physical action connected with the post-decisional process. That is, the post-decisional process may be a physical action _or_ a mental action. There is one distinction that should be brought out here however. There appears to be a difference between the phrases "I have decided that..." and "I have decided to...". The latter particularly clearly implies that some sort of action (physical) is intended on the part of the person who made the decision. The former may perhaps more reasonably be interpreted to indicate that some sort of judgment has taken place and there need be no activity take place after the judgment. For example, "I have decided that today is Tuesday" doesn't imply that I have to

do anything about it. There could be a parallel drawn between "decide that" and judgments and between "decide to" and decisions. The main distinction that should be drawn, however, is the difference between the judgments and decisions _per se_. Judgments can be right or wrong, good or bad, etc., but decisions _per se_ are not to be thought of as good or bad, etc.

One argument against using "decide that" for judgments and "decide to" for decisions is that sometimes "decide that" and "decide to" are used as near synonyms. Take for example, "I have decided that I will kill my sister" and "I have decided to kill my sister". In this example there is no great difference between the "decide to" and the "decide that". This objection may rule out the parallel I have drawn between "I have decided that . . ." as indicative of judgments and "I have decided to . . ." as indicative of decisions; but I would still like to maintain that there is the difference between judgments and decisions hitherto mentioned. At best perhaps I can only maintain that in _some_ cases "I have decided that . . ." is a phrase indicating that a judgment has taken place and in _some_ cases "I have decided to . . ." is a phrase indicating that a decision has taken place.

An "act of decision" then must include: pre-decisional process, decision _per se_, and post-decisional processes.

1.2 Other Definitions of "Decision-Making".

There is apparently no agreement among authors as to which of the above areas (pre-decisional, decision per se, post-decisional) are to be included in a concept of 'decision-making'.

One account that varies somewhat from Austin or Ofstad is given by Nathan Kogan and Michael Wallach. They make only two distinctions in their account of decision-making: a decisional process (not per se) and a post-decisional process. The decisional process includes all types of judgments, bet making, risk taking, cognitive and motivational orientated "happenings" and other things that could be called decisions of moral value. It appears they have grouped the pre-decisional and the decisional areas together. In their book they do not appear much concerned with a specific concept of decision-making as their main interest is in taking statistics on the judgments of four different types of personality. They do however seem to agree that it is the consequences of a decision that are good or bad and not the decision. They say:

> Decisions generally have consequences. When these
> consequences are positive, the decision-maker's
> goals may have been served; when the consequences
> are negative, the decision-maker's goals have been
> hindered or blocked.[1]

Here there is some indication that degree of intentions are involved as well as the fact that it is the post-decisional processes that

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[1] Michael A. Wallach and A. Kogan, Risk-Taking--A Study in Cognition and Personality (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964), p. 70.

are successful or unsuccessful. One has to be aware of one's goals of intentions before one can <u>decide</u> whether they are hindered or helped.

This is only a brief indication that there are certainly other notions of 'decision-making' but to go over them all would be a futile task for this paper. I shall therefore go directly to Ofstad's and Austin's notions.

2. Ofstad on Decisions.

Ofstad first of all gives us a definition of "decision".
In framing his definition Ofstad explains how he uses "decisions";
he then expounds on the conditions that have to be present before
it can be said that a decision has been made; and lastly he distin-
guishes the different types of decisions that are possible. I
shall take them in that order.

Ofstad starts by explaining why he chose the word "decision"
rather than some other expression, and at the same time explains
what the essence of a decision is. He says:

> Which of the terms 'choice', 'action',
> 'decision' is to be preferred?
>   If the term 'choice' is taken to refer
> to the act or process of deciding between
> different alternatives, it seems to me that
> terms like 'decision' or 'action' are more
> useful for our purposes. The act of decid-
> ing is closely related to, if not identical
> with, the decision itself; and the process
> of deciding, e.g., the deliberation on dif-
> ferent consequences of possible courses of
> action, is of importance to us, not so much
> qua process, as qua process leading to a
> certain decision or action.[1] (My italics.)

Judging from the above quote, Ofstad seems to want to indi-
cate that what he calls the "process of deciding" leads to an action

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[1]Harald Ofstad, An Inquiry Into the Freedom of Decision (Oslo,
Norway: University of Oslo Press, 1961), p. 14.

or a decision. At this point it is not clear what Ofstad intends
to convey by "action" and "decision". Let us assume that the "pro-
cess of deciding" refers to a pre-decisional process. The confusing
part is that this process of deciding is supposed to <u>lead to</u> an
<u>action or decision</u>. If the two (action and decision) are not to be
taken as synonymous, then the "action" could refer to some post-
decisional process and the "decision" might refer to the decision
<u>per se</u>; or, if they are to be taken as synonymous, then both expres-
sions could be referring to the decision <u>per se</u>. Ofstad has blurred
the distinction between the two alternatives. I choose to interpret
the confusion in the direction of the later alternative and consider
"action" and "decision" to be synonymous. This interpretation
corresponds to the idea that decisions <u>per se</u> are actions as Ofstad
appears to indicate in the above quotation. What can be established
from the above quotation for sure then is that: (1) there are
decisions <u>per se</u> which are identical with the "act of deciding",
and (2) there is an altogether different process called the "process
of deciding" which is some sort of deliberation, and I have called
it a pre-decisional process.

It should be noted the 'action' here involved is not, for
Ofstad, an act on in a narrow sense. It involves, says Ofstad,
thinking about such and such, changing one's habits or character,
trying to do something, or making up one's mind to build a house.[1]

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[1]<u>Ibid</u>., p. 16.

Since, according to Ofstad, "choice" referred to actions of this type, "choice" will be eliminated, and since "action" and "decision" are synonymous in this respect, Ofstad decided that the expression "decision" would be used. Although his reasons for choosing the one over the others are not particularly clear, the advantage of being consistent in using one of them, I would think, is obvious. There are however a few objections that may be made at this point.

2.1 Problems.

How are we to make sense of Ofstad's claim that decisions per se are actions? As discussed in Chapter I, I contend that decisions per se are not readily conceived as actions--to say the least: they cannot be repeated (that is, decision per se cannot be repeated in much the same way as "winning" of a game cannot be repeated); and the decision per se does not have duration. If 'decision' (in this sense of "decision") were to have duration, one should expect it to make sense to say: "I have now been decid- ing for five minutes, and I think I am half done with it". In any event it seems that one is inhibited from making a decision per se over again and one is not normally inhibited from performing an action over again. It seems to this writer one cannot talk about the "act of decision" and call it an action when referring to the decision per se, any more than one can talk about the "act of winning a game".

If by "act of decision" Ofstad referred to something more than the decision per se, then perhaps the terminology employing "act

of decision" may have become helpful. That is, if Ofstad, by "act of decision" had referred to a pre-decisional process and the decision per se and even some sort of post-decisional processes, then perhaps Ofstad would not be misleading us too badly. Finally it should be added that even if Ofstad by "act of decision" were referring to something which is distinguishable from pre- and post-decisional processes, the fact that it sounds odd to refer to this something as though it had duration, does not preclude a linguistic recommendation in this direction. Ofstad offers no arguments in favour of the idea that he is simply calling decisions per se actions and that this is only a linguistic recommendation on his part.

2.2. Conditions for Decisions.

After having chosen the term "decision" as a tool, Ofstad goes on to interpret "P has made a decision" in, what he calls, three "vague" and "popular" directions. These are: (A) That P has started a series of behavioral reactions in favour of something, (B) That P has "made up his mind" to do a certain action, which he has no doubts that he ought to do, and (C) That P made a judgment regarding what he ought to do in a certain situation, after having deliberated on some other possible courses of action (this could be rephrased: A would be the right thing for P to do).[1] What then does it mean to say that P has made a decision? Ofstad claims that

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[1] Ibid., p. 15.

(C) offers the best response to that query. Thus, "What does it mean to say that P has made a decision?" may best be answered that P made a judgment regarding what he ought to do in a certain situation. The choice might have been made a little less obvious (at least it seems to have been obvious for Ofstad), if one had substituted something else for say (B). The phrase "making up one's mind" is often used as a plausible transmitter alternative or a synonym for "decision" or "deciding". In effect, if one were to rephrase (B) it might read: "P has decided to do a certain action which he has no doubts he should do". This, however, does not add much to the explanation of what Ofstad intends to mean by "to make a decision". A negation of (B) might be, "P was prepared to do something that he had no doubt that he ought NOT to do". This formulation of (B) makes the choice of (C) over (B) considerably less obvious. However (C) was chosen by Ofstad to represent the interpretation of "P has made a decision". He does not successfully clear up the problems with the ambiguous use of the expression "ought to" in the formulation; and, we are not informed as to why these three particular formulations were chosen to represent the popular voice. In none of the three formulations is there any mention of the post-decisional operations which Ofstad, at least occasionally, seems to consider an integral part of decision making (vide below).

There are three major conditions, Ofstad maintains, that have to be fulfilled before it can be said that P has made a decision. His three conditions may be broken up into six sub-conditions, all

of which may be equally important. To avoid confusion, however, I shall have headings only for Ofstad's conditions.

2.21. Alternative Choices.

Ofstad's first condition is that P must be aware of at least two choice alternatives, that is, there must be at least two directions that may be pursued; decidion-making must involve internalized commitment; and there must be some sign or symbol to indicate that P is actually aware of the two alternatives.[1] This one condition can be broken up into three conditions: first, that P must be aware of his choice alternatives; second, decision-making involves internalized commitment; and thirdly, there must be some signs that P is aware that there are at least two alternatives. These conditions are instigated, so it seems, in order to exclude, as possible examples of decision-making, impulsive or spontaneous reactions. Any action done in a fit of impulsiveness is not, according to Ofstad, to be designated as a "decision".

2.22. Problems.

The main problem in this area is to find out how to draw the line between spontaneous choice (which I suppose Ofstad would accept) and spontaneous reaction (which Ofstad would not accept as a decision). If I were presented with two alternatives A_1 and A_2, I may spontaneously choose A_2, the deliberation being exceedingly short and unsystematic, or, practically speaking, non-existent It may still

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[1]Ibid., p. 15.

count as a decision, according to Ofstad, since I should most likely be aware of the alternatives; moreover, there may be a commitment, and there may be a sign to indicate my awareness of the alternatives. How then do we determine whether something is a spontaneous choice, or simply a spontaneous reaction?

2.23. Deliberation.

Before it can be said that a decision has taken place, according to Ofstad, there must be some, but not zero, degree of deliberation between the alternatives. That is, the two or more alternatives must be weighed against each other, however short or unsystematic the deliberation. Not only must the alternatives be present, but they all must be considered at least to some degree.

2.24. Problems.

The problem is still: what is the minimum duration of deliberation required to justify a classification under 'decisions'? Or, how unsystematic must the deliberation be before a classification is considered unwarranted? Or, how unsystematic must the deliberation be, in order to justify a classification under spontaneous reaction rather than spontaneous choice? These questions are simply not considered by Ofstad and from the information given by Ofstad, I would not even venture a guess as to his response. Suffice it to say that for Ofstad there must be some degree of more or less systematic deliberation between at least two alternatives before it can be said there is a decision involved.

2.25. <u>Motivation</u>.

As a third condition Ofstad simply states: ". . . the person must arrive at a judgment whereby he commits himself to one alternative."[1] In the paragraph following this quotation Ofstad refers to this commitment as a "degree of motivation". This appears to be a reference to some sort of pre-decisional process. That is, Ofstad does not want decision-making to be just a mental process--there must be a commitments other than an intellectual commitment. As Ofstad says, it would be "inconvenient" to his purposes for decision-making to be just a mental process. In a summarization of the above quotation Ofstad himself breaks it up into two parts. (1) That P arrived at the judgment that he ought to do A, and (2) That P was motivated. At this point it would now appear that by "act of decision" Ofstad intends to convey something that would include not only decisions <u>per se</u>, but some pre-decisional process as well. This is assuming that motivation would have something to do with the deliberation and argumentation that would go on before the decision <u>per se</u> would take place. Motivation would help (or hinder, as the case may be) the person in his attempt to eliminate one of his choice alternatives.

2.26. <u>Problems in Motivation</u>.

The first problem is Ofstad's choice of the words "ought to do" in (1) above. Ofstad suggests that "ought to do" means the

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[1]<u>Ibid</u>., p. 16.

same thing as the "right thing to do". We may then interpret "ought

to do" in the direction of moral actions. That is, A could be done

in accordance with my general moral orientation--or refer to my

basic ethical norms and the like. This interpretation would exclude

from decision-making actions which are not morally relevant (growing

a beard, for example).

However, if "ought to do" is interpreted in a direction so

as to include cases of beard growing in decision-making, then it is

hard to see how Ofstad is saying anything other than P actually

chooses A.

The second and more important area of criticism is concerned

with (2) and the requirement of motivation. The function of this

criterion was to give decisions more "force" than a mere mental

process. Ofstad does not have a definite minimum value of motiva-

tion needed in order for something to qualify as a decision, he

only says: "P must be motivated . . .". The term "motivated" how-

ever is notoriously vague and ambiguous. To quote a recent author:

> In the last twenty years motivation has become
> a central concept in psychology. Indeed, it is
> fair to say that today it is one of the basic
> ingredients of most modern theories of learning,
> personality, and social behavior. There is one
> stumbling-block in this noteworthy development,
> however, for the particular conception of moti-
> vation which most psychologists employ is based
> on the outmoded model implied by Cannon in his
> classical statement of the local theories of
> hunger and thirst. Cannon's theories were good
> in their day, but the new facts available on
> the psychological basis of motivation demand
> that we abandon the older conceptualizations

> and follow new theories, not only in the study
> of motivation itself, but also in the applica-
> tion of motivational concepts to other areas of
> psychology.[1]

The above quotation seems to at least indicate that theories on

motivation are going through a transition period, and one should

be reluctant to whole-hearted acceptance of any one theory.

But there is a more serious problem with the term "moti-

vation" as used in this reference. To quote another author:

> All behavior is motivated, and the basic
> motivating forces are the biological needs
> of the organism. The psychological conse-
> quences of the assertion of bodily needs are
> called drives. Drives initiate behavior
> that tends to reduce or abolish the condi-
> tions prompting them.[2]

Thus it seems that no matter what we do, deciding, wishing,

jumping or whatever it may be, it is all, by definition, motivated;

and it is clearly redundant to specify that our decisions have to

be motivated. With the use of "motivation" at this point in his

work, one has to be on guard that Ofstad is not trying to gain some-

thing by exploiting the vagueness of this term. Let us for the time

being then interpret the term "motivation" as "having a relatively

high degree of intention". "Degree of intention" may not be any less

vague but it may show some weakness in the use of the term "motivation"

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[1] Richard A. King, _Readings for an Introduction to Psychology_
(New York, Toronto, London: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1961), p. 366.

[2] Frank E. Geldard, _Fundamentals of Psychology_ (New York,
London: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 1962), p. 30.

later on. We might sum up Ofstad's views on the conditions of "decision-making" as follows:

> Def: P, in S, will be said to have made a decision
> in favour of alternative A if the following three
> conditions are fulfilled:
>
> (1) P deliberated in S between A and at least one
> other alternative, A_1;
>
> (2) P, in S, arrived at the judgment that he ought
> to do A, and
>
> (3) P, in S, was motivated towards A.[1]

Ofstad admits there would be some difficulty in applying these conditions to any given case, but for the purpose of his inquiry he does not want to give a definition that could be measured operationally to any greater extent. Assuming that he has, at least roughly and tentatively, delimited some concept 'decision', Ofstad goes on to elaborate on the different types of decisions that he considers possible.

2.3. Different Possible Types of Decisions.

Since Ofstad seems to ramble a bit at this point, I have for the sake of convenience limited the possible types of decisions to two, and I will include a number of factors that, according to Ofstad, appear to influence these two types of decisions.

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[1] These are paraphrased from pages 16-17 of Inquiry Into Freedom of Decision by Ofstad.

The two main types of decisions that are possible, according to Ofstad, are <u>successful</u> decisions and <u>stable</u> decisions.

2.31. <u>Successful Decisions</u>.

"A decision which leads to a planned result we shall call a '<u>successful</u>' decision."[1] The concept of 'successfulness' is far more difficult that might appear at first sight. The "planned result" appears to be the result that one intended or the intentions that one more or less clearly (definitely) might have had in mind at the time of the decision <u>per se</u>. If the outcome (as measured by a comparison of the decision <u>per se</u> and the post-decisional process) is not acceptable to the agent, the decision is "unsuccessful". Ofstad seems to think in terms of a dichotomy rather than a continuum: there are only either completely successful or completely unsuccessful decisions. The factors that influence the successfulness or unsuccessfulness of a decision are, according to Ofstad, "<u>factors beyond the control of the agent</u>".[2] What these factors are is not specified by Ofstad; he merely states that factors which are not in the agent's power <u>and</u> are beyond the bounds of the agent's capabilities are the factors that influence the successfulness of a decision.

2.32. <u>Problems in Successfulness</u>.

I would like, first of all, to point out that because someone asks a question of an agent, that in itself does not make the question

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[1] Ofstad, <u>Freedom of Decision</u>, p. 17.

[2] <u>Loc. cit</u>.

a common one or a question that makes sense. That is, no matter how many times it is asked which of the two men, Nixon or Kennedy, is the more retrospective, it still doesn't make sense--even though one might receive a response as though the question was understood and did make sense.

In a somewhat like manner, there is a similar problem with successful decisions. There is no doubt one would receive a response to a query which included successful and unsuccessful decisions. For example, on a recent financial page a certain company B made a decision to invest some money in the north. There was a 150% return in profits. The story quoted an official from the company stating that the decision (to invest in the north) was a successful one. I believe also that other examples could be found where a successful decision was referred to.

But I would like to ask: what is it here that is successful? What does one refer to when one talks about successful decisions? It is unlikely that one is referring to a decision per se. If a decision per se is like the winning of a game, I think it is obvious that decisions per se cannot be conceived of as successful or unsuccessful.

When Ofstad first referred to "act of decision" he seemed to exclude any post-decisional process. At least there was a good deal of ambiguity involved. But now what can Ofstad be intending to convey by the notion of 'successful decisions'? It cannot be

the decision _per se_; consequently he must now be introducing a post-decisional process. What else could it be? I maintain that by 'successful decisions' he is in fact referring to post-decisional processes as in fact everyone else is when he talks about successful decisions in ordinary speech.

Take the case of company B and their investment in the North. Was it not the process that happened after the decision (_per se_) was made, that was successful? The gaining of more money that came as a result of the decision is what is referred to as successful. In Ofstad's own example, that of growing a beard, it is the post-decisional actions or results that determine the successfulness or the unsuccessfulness of the "decision". There appear to be two types of _things_ here involved. There are those things which can be successful or unsuccessful (in the sense of good, bad, advantageous, unfortunate, etc.) and this is post-decisional and/or physical action; and there is a verbal or mental "happening" to which the terms "successful" or "unsuccessful" do not apply.

On closer inspection then one finds it is the _outcome_ that is successful or unsuccessful. One does not judge the results (post-decisional process) by themselves, but one judges the _results_ in comparison with the intentions or the decision _per se_. If somehow the decision _per se_ (the making manifest of the agent's intentions) and the results (post-decisional process) are compatible, then the decision (in the widest sense of "decision", not _per se_) is successful.

With the introduction of the intentions of an agent at this point, the way ahead becomes very unclear with vague, interwoven and unlimited levels of intentions. Let us say that P has decided to marry. If one were to ask him why (what his intentions were) he wished to be married, I'm sure the indefiniteness of his intentions would become very clear. A multitude of intermingling reasons could be given. How could P judge if the outcome of his decision was successful? What means would he have at his disposal to draw the line between a successful and an unsuccessful decision? This is a very over simplified model, but it serves well to point out the difficulties that could arise when discussing definiteness of intentions.

Even if P did have a high degree of definiteness of intention; even if P really knew what he wanted, the problem is still there as to how he is going to differentiate between the successful and the unsuccessful decisions in terms of a strict dichotomy. It is very strange that Ofstad should introduce this dichotomy between successful and unsuccessful decisions. Take for example, three professors of philosophy who decide to come to Canada to make more money. They all wish to make exactly $10,000 more per year. Let's say A makes $9,900 more, B makes $2,600 more and C makes $1,000 less. Here the definiteness of intention is high--would one therefore be committed to say that all three decisions were unsuccessful? Would we not probably say that perhaps the decisions were unequally successful rather than equally unsuccessful? But to admit to the former alternative

would be to admit to a continuum rather than a dichotomy between
successful and unsuccessful decisions. Since successful decisions
refer to a post-decisional process, to insist on a dichotomy would
be to flagrantly disregard ordinary usage of the word successful.
"Not entirely successful" appears to be a common usage and is, I
believe, indicative of a continuum from successful to unsuccessful
vis-a-vis decisions (not decisions _per se_).

A second problem is concerned with what Ofstad calls "factors
the person cannot influence". It is difficult to imagine what
Ofstad has in mind when he refers to these so called "factors".
Suppose one fell off a ship at sea and _decided_ to swim to shore by
going to the left rather than the right, chose the left, got half
way there, found out he couldn't physically make it, and drowns.
In this case would one's physical incapabilities be included in the
factors that are beyond one's control? Would one say that one had
made an unsuccessful decision in this case? Clearly no one, in that
situation, would say that it was an unsuccessful decision; one would
be more inclined to say something about an unsuccessful attempt to
swim to shore. But what could one possibly mean if one did say that
it was an unsuccessful decision? Would one want to refer to the fact
that what one thought was a decision was not a decision at all and
one was merely mistaken when one thought it was a decision? How many
attempts should one make before saying it was an unsuccessful deci-
sion? The best we can do perhaps is to admit that by successful
decision Ofstad is referring to the post-decisional process, but I

do not see a solution for having a dichotomy instead of a continuum between successful and unsuccessful decisions.

2.33. Stability.

The concept of 'stability' is discussed to a greater extent by Ofstad and is clearly intended to have deeper implications and greater import than the concept of 'successfulness'. Stable decisions are decisions that have the "cognitive and motivational orientation of an agent and meet no "inner resistance" from within the agent."[1] There is explicitly a continuum involved from maximum stable decisions to maximum unstable decisions. A maximum unstable decision occurs when P has made up his mind to accept alternative A, then begins to oscillate to A_1, then back to A, then to A_1, etc. A maximum stable decision would occur if P fixed on one alternative, say A_2, and then did not change his position. One can therefore have a more or less stable decision.

The "inner resistance" referred to above appears to be a cause of severe conflict-situations. The higher the inner resistance, according to Ofstad, the more difficult it is to have a stable decision. It is not impossible to have a stable decision when the inner resistance is high, just difficult. There seems to be an incompatability between stability and high inner resistance. If there is no inner resistance to a decision, the decision comes about

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[1]Ibid., p. 17.

on request, as it were. An illustration of a case where inner

resistance plays a role would be say, if one's house were burning

down and one's child were inside. The cognitive and motivational

orientation would be to get the child out. The inner resistance

in this case could be a fear of fire or death that would be suffi-

ciently strong to hold one back. A conflict-situation would then

arise between the fear (if it was strong enough) and the desire to

remove the child.

This "cognitive and motivational orientation" is another

name for what Ofstad calls "integration". To quote Ofstad:

> Def.: The decision D_1, made by the person
> P_1 is <u>more well-integrated than</u> the decision
> D_2 made by the person P_2 if, and only if, D_1
> more than D_2 is supported by the person's whole
> motivational and cognitive orientation.[1]

It is not clear whether Ofstad intends stability and integr-

ation to be synonyms, but at least they are very closely parallel.

To have a stable decision, according to Ofstad, is to have a high

degree of integration (at least higher than the inner resistance).

There is a continuum involved in integration from low-integrated

decision at one end to high-integrated decisions at the other end.

There are no absolute guarantees, says Ofstad, but if the inner

resistance is higher than the integration it is more likely that the

decision will be unstable; if the integration is higher than the

inner resistance then it is more likely that the decision will be

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[1]Ibid., p. 18.

stable. Thus integration and stability could very easily be synony-
mous phrases.

It also appears that stability (integration) and inner
resistance are the factors that account for the distinction between
major and minor decisions. For a decision to be a major one, the
decision has to be stable, the agent highly-integrated and in a
conflict-situation. A minor decision, according to Ofstad, seems to
be of the type which, to a great extent, lacks the quality of being
both highly-integrated and having high inner resistance and the
minor decision may or may not be stable.

In summary, it is the degree of cognitive and motivational
orientation (integration) that determines the stability of a deci-
sion. The higher the integration of an agent towards a decision,
the more likely the decision will be stable; the higher the inner
resistance within an agent towards a decision, the more likely the
decision will be unstable. With an absence of both high-integration
and inner resistance on the part of an agent the decision could be
either stable or unstable. Since major decisions, according to
Ofstad, must be stable (as a major decision occurs when the integra-
tion is high), oscillation (unstable decisions) can only take place
in the case of minor decisions.

2.34. Problems in Stability.

There seems to be a number of problems concerned with the
concept of 'stability'. It would be interesting, for example, to

know just what exactly constitutes instability. Ofstad has mentioned
oscillation. But is it simply the number of times that one re-
decides that determines the instability? Or is it the length of
time between the decisions that determines the instability? If it
is simply the number of times that one re-decides, then I suppose
that <u>one</u> re-decision would be sufficient to label the first decision
as unstable. But if length of time between decisions is also a
factor; how long does one have to wait before one can be reassured
about the stability of a decision?

I think the friendliest possible interpretation of Ofstad
would be to say that length of time between decisions is not involved;
and that one re-decision would be more toward the maximum stable end
of the continuum than two re-decisions would be. Thus any re-decision,
no matter when it comes, would affect the stability of the first
decision.

There is a much more serious contention however, concerning
the concepts of 'integration' and 'inner resistance'. Perhaps one
of the main problems is just what is this inner resistance? What is
its relationship to integration? Ofstad has defined integration as
the cognitive and motivational orientation of an individual. But
inner resistance is also tied up with the cognitive and motivational
orientation of an individual. Motivation is closely connected to
our emotional experiences and therefore, as well, motivation is
closely connected to "inner resistance" as this has something to do
with what goes on inside of us. What then is the difference between

inner resistance and integration? My contention is that they are both the same thing, that is, the cognitive and motivational orientation of the individual. One is the attraction (or attracting force)--integration; and the other is a repelling force--inner resistance.

If inner resistance and integration can be conceived of as repelling and attracting forces, then perhaps modern psychology has already a terminology to describe these effects. In fact inner resistance and integration are very similar to what are commonly called "avoidance valences" and "approach valences". Frank Geldard says:

> Whenever more than one motivating condition exists, there is the occasion for choice behavior. Whereas children tend to make abrupt, unreflective choices, adults tend to let language or thought process intervene. These typically resolve any conflict caused by the multiple motives and obviate the necessity for impulsive choice. Whenever incompatible or opposing drives are simultaneously active, the possibility of minor or major conflict exists, and, when conflict occurs, these are the seeds of frustration. Whether or not these will be important depends on the frustration tolerance of the individual.
> General situations serving as sources of frustration may be broadly classed as (a) thwarting of motives by interposition of barriers, (b) approach-approach conflicts, (c) avoidance-avoidance conflicts, (d) approach-avoidance conflicts.[1]

Is it therefore not possible that Ofstad's concept is the same as Geldard's, and Ofstad is giving us a theory of frustration. Minor

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[1] Geldard, loc. cit., p. 179.

decisions <u>may</u> be the approach-approach type of conflicts (and also the avoidance-avoidance conflicts) and these would be decisions where there is either all integration or all inner resistance and probably therefore of little importance to the individual. Major decisions could be the approach-avoidance type of conflict where there is a definite frustrating conflict involved. Geldard says further:

> Goal-objects not infrequently possess double valences; they are both positive and negative, . . . The attitude developed towards such situations, those having attractive and unattractive features, we call <u>ambivalence</u>. The child would like to get into the cookie jar, but remembers the punishment associated with the last trip to it. It is not only the young, of course, who display ambivalence. Many, if not most of the situations of adult life involving <u>major decisions</u> (my italics), --choice of career, problems of courtship and marriage, . . . have both attractive and unattractive features connected with them.[1]

I am not too sure Ofstad would want to compare inner resistance to the avoidance valence and integration to the approach valence, as Ofstad stresses the idea that integration is far more important than inner resistance. There is, however, an amazing similarity between the two theories. In stressing integration over inner resistance, I think Ofstad has also overlooked an important aspect of inner resistance. I would claim that it is possible to have a <u>stable</u> decision even though the inner resistance is higher than the

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[1]Ibid., p. 170.

integration. It is conceivable that there would be a situation where the avoidance of a particular thing is stronger than the approach and yet this might result in a very stable decision. An example would be say, on the battle field, I am highly motivated to be honourable and stay and fight, and yet because of my inner resistance I want to run. I deliberate a very short while and then I run. The decision could be very stable and yet it would be the inner resistance that was dominant. Thus inner resistance and integration are equally important and one affects the individual as much as the other.

Reference to 'stability' at this point adds nothing to what has been said by Ofstad to the concepts of inner resistance and integration. It would have been better if Ofstad had used "stability" to refer only to the number of times that one re-decides; then as another type of decision, one could have decisions assessed for their integration/inner resistance (or distinct from decisions assessed for their stability). Of course the new nomenclature (approach-avoidance valences) does not show that Ofstad's nomenclature is inferior, but rather that Ofstad's theory is more of a behavior analysis than a linguistic recommendation.

Ofstad first suggested that "act of deciding" was identical with the "decision itself". After the analysis of his further exposition on decisions, I believe it is apparent that Ofstad has included more than just the "decision itself" in the "act of deciding". Due to his concern with integration and inner resistance (the

cognitive and motivational orientation of the individual) it appears

there is some pre-decisional process that takes place. One would be

concerned with the argumentation, deliberation that goes on before

a decision is reached and one is motivated for or against any given

alternative. Ofstad is also concerned with the concept of 'success-

fulness'. A plausible reason as to why Ofstad wants to include suc-

cessfulness is that Ofstad has some post-decisional process included

in his concept of 'decision-making'. This would leave us with what

I call the decision <u>per se</u> which I claim to be a "success" word and

references to the decision <u>per se</u> as being successful, etc., just

don't seem to apply. All three areas could be applied to Ofstad's

concept of 'decision-making'.

2.4. <u>Decision as a Commitment on the Part of an Individual</u>.

Ofstad wants to stress the idea that an individual has

entirely committed himself--his personality and norms playing an

important role--when he makes a decision of the stable, high-inte-

grated and successful type. This idea is expressly brought out in

an article in the <u>Journal of Philosophy</u>--"Can We Produce Decisions?"[1]

Ofstad's main concern in this paper is: whether we can pro-

duce decisions as easily, say, as we can produce a smile or take a

breath. The obvious answer is, of course, that it depends upon

what kind of decision one has in mind. If one has in mind a

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[1]Harald Ofstad, "Can We Produce Decisions?", <u>The Journal of
Philosophy</u>, Vol. LVI, No. 3 (1959), p. 89.

low-integrated decision, where there is little or no commitment on the part of the individual, then in most normal cases it is just as easy to make that type of decision as it is to talk. So, according to Ofstad, the most benevolent person in the world could decide to kill his brother. If he were truly benevolent however, his decision would be just so many words, as there would, in all probability, be a high degree of inner resistance and the decision would most likely be low-integrated and unstable. There would be no commitment on the part of the individual. If by "decision" one intends to convey what Ofstad calls "low-integrated decisions", it does seem as easy to produce "decisions" as it is to talk.

If, however, one has in mind a high-integrated decision, the problem becomes more difficult. According to Ofstad, there are two types of decisions, that are of interest to us, that can be highly integrated. There are high-integrated decisions that are stable and yet have no, or very little, inner resistance; and there are high-integrated decisions that are stable and yet have a high degree of inner resistance. The former, according to Ofstad, still fall within the realm of easily-produced decisions. For example, I decide to go on a long trip with a friend; it could be a very stable decision; highly integrated and would involve no inner resistance on my part. This type of decision is very easily produced according to Ofstad.

The important decisions for Ofstad are then the high-integrated, stable decisions that are in a conflict-situation. The

as to whether we can produce these decisions in an easy manner is a crucial one.[1] Ofstad sums up the question in this manner:

> . . . to what degree does a person, who in a
> certain situation decided in an ethically
> wrong way, and felt a strong resistance
> against deciding as he ought to, have in his
> power to make an ethically right decision?[2]

Ofstad points out that he could not, at that time, make a high-integrated stable decision to become a Mohammedan. It is not part of his value system; it is not part of his personality to become one. A decision to become a Mohammedan would not, for Ofstad, be high-integrated nor in a conflict-situation. It would not, therefore, be in his power to make such a decision (high-integrated and stable). He would have to change his entire personality; and for Ofstad this can't be done in five minutes, as if his personality were a piece of clay. An individualistic approach comes to the foreground, and answers to the question on different types of

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[1]There is one further distinction that Ofstad deems important at this point. This is the distinction of "libertas specificationes" and "libertas contrarietatis". For example, the former is deciding between two kinds of drinks, and the latter is deciding whether or not to drink at all. It seems odd that he should bring out this distinction, because if I am in a conflict situation, for example, trying to catch a train, I don't see any difference in the importance of choosing between which train to take and whether or not to take a train at all. To take a wrong train may even prove more disastrous. If I make the wrong choice (in a given situation) either decision will produce trying consequences. Thus, if I take the wrong train, as opposed to no train at all, I am still not going to get to where I wanted to go and the distinction between the two becomes a minor one.

[2]Ofstad, "Can We Produce Decisions?", p. 92.

decision that are possible will depend upon the nature of the chooser

and the particular situation that he is in. Ofstad sums up the

answer to his problem in the following way:

> If by decision we mean a decision that is
> sufficiently high integrated to be stable
> in severe conflict-situations, and if by
> "having in one's power to make a decision"
> we mean there is a set of activities which,
> by being performed, will have the decision
> as its immediate result, then there are
> decisions that we do not have in our power
> to make.[1]

Ofstad does not, however, rule out the element of time. If in a

matter of time one's psychological, motivational forces undergo

a chance, then perhaps a decision that was not in one's power to

make at time t, may be possible at a later time t_1.

I think it should be obvious that Ofstad is offering us a

theory of behavior. He is telling us something about the way people

act (or at least how Ofstad acts) but he offers only illustrations

for his point of view (as opposed to evidence). On the face of it

Ofstad presents his views as if they were simply linguistic recom-

mendations, but the similarity between his thoughts and some con-

temporary views on behavior are too striking to overlook.

The important point, however, vis-a-vis this paper, is that

Ofstad regards major decision-making as involving an integral part

of one's personality, something that one commits oneself to in spite

of any inward opposition. One has to commit oneself in bones and

marrow to produce a major decision.

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[1]_Ibid_., p. 93.

3. <u>Austin on Decisions</u>.

It might appear at first sight that there is not too much in Austin's work on decision-making. However in this chapter I wish to expound on Austin's views on performatives and illocutionary forces in order to adapt these distinctions to a concept of decision-making. Austin himself hints that the doctrine of illocutionary forces may be adapted to other philosophic problems. He says:

> But we shall not get really clear about this word 'good' and what we use it to do until, ideally, we have a complete list of those illocutionary acts of which commending, grading, etc., are isolated specimens--until we know how many such acts there are and what are their relationships and inter-connexions. Here, then, is an instance of one possible application of the kind of general theory we have been considering; no doubt there are many others.[1]

The purpose of this chapter will then be to expound on the special and general theories and then adapt the theories to a concept of decision-making.

3.1. <u>Performative Utterances</u>.

Austin's objective is to make us aware that not all utterances are simply true or false. Not only are there utterances that are

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[1]Austin, J. L. <u>How to do Things with Words</u>. (New York: A Galaxy Book, Oxford University Press, 1965).

neither true nor false, but these utterances are of importance to us and as such should be classed in their own way. In short, simply because an utterance is neither true nor false doesn't mean that the utterance is sheer nonsense. One must, however, find the right way to treat these utterances that are grammatically correct, classed, by some, as statements, and are in the first person singular, present indicative, active. Not only are there utterances that fulfill the above conditions, but one would also say that in uttering such a phrase one is "doing" something rather than just "saying" something. The classic examples are "I do . . ." in a marriage ceremony and "I apologize" when I tread on your toe. When I say (utter) the above I am not describing a situation or giving a report on my inner feelings, but rather doing an action. These are what Austin calls performatives. He says:

> A. they do not describe or report or constate anything at all, are not true or false, and
>
> B. the uttering of the sentence is, or is a part of the doing of an action, which again would not normally be described as saying something.[1]

Austin is not referring to some "internal spiritual act" of which, for example, the words "I do" would be a report. For example, the utterance "I promise to be there tomorrow", is a performative; it is _not_ a report of an "internalized act" of some

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[1]_Ibid_., p. 5.

nature. The utterance has to be a function of the situation--when one is actually engaged in promising. Austin's performatives then, do not typically report facts and are not to be considered true nor false, although they may imply something that is true or false. According to Austin the fact the implications may be true or false does not reflect on the original utterance; and the original utterance can remain free from any descriptive force. The utterance "I do" in a marriage ceremony implies that one is not already married, that one is somewhat sane, etc. These implications may be true or false, but the utterance "I do" is neither.

Austin also indicates that most performatives are of the same grammatical form; first person, singular, present indicative, active. Not all verbs in the above form are performative; but a majority of the performatives are of this form. This is rather an important distinction. The use of a past tense makes the utterance clearly a case of reporting something--something a performative does not typically do. "I promised yesterday. . ." is a report on what was happening yesterday. Likewise "He promises . . ." is a report of someone else's actions. To utter "I promise . . ." is to perform two actions; one, the verbal act of uttering something; two, the act of promising. "I promise" is not a report on my act of promising--it is the act of promising.

According to Austin there are some notable and interesting exceptions to the above rule. In spite of the fact that the standard grammatical form is in the first person, there are some instances of

performatives in the second and third person with the passive voice.
These are usually written notices which, if said by an individual,
would be performatives. Austin also wants to call the written
notices performatives. "You are hereby warned that this bridge is
unsafe for travel" would be a good example. The word "hereby" is
usually inserted (or could very easily be inserted). Since it is
possible to insert or expand these performatives, it should also be
possible to shorten or reduce them. To use Austin's example, "I
hereby warn you this bull is dangerous" could be shortened to "Bull".
The latter is extremely ambiguous as to its performative function
and utterances of this type are called by Austin, primary performa-
tive utterances. The opposite of a primary performative utterance
is an explicit performative utterance. These are utterances like
"I hereby . . . so and so", etc. There appears to be some sort of
vague continuum involved from primary performative utterances to
explicit performative utterances. One is not however, given any
means as to how one distinguishes a primary performative utterance
from an explicit performative utterance. According to Austin, full
commitment on the part of the individual can only be experienced
with the expression of the full explicit performative utterance.[1]

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[1]Actually all that Austin says is: "It may, however be un-
certain in fact, and, so far as the mere utterance is concerned, is
always left uncertain when we use so inexplicit a formula as the mere
imperative 'go', whether the utterer is ordering (or is purporting to
order) me to go or merely advising, entreating, or what not me to go.
Similarly 'There is a bull in the field' may or may not be a warning,
for I might just be describing the scenery and 'I shall be there' may
or may not be a promise. Here we have the primative as distinct from

Again it must be noted, the explicit performative utterance performs the function of making explicit the act we are performing-- the explicit performative utterance does not state, explain or report on the act being accomplished. With an explicit performative utterance we are not stating what we are going to do or telling (expressing) what we are feeling on the inside, rather we are performing an act. To quote Austin, "And so in the same way, to say 'I warn you that . . .' or 'I order you to . . .' or 'I promise that . . .' is not to state that you are doing something, but it makes it plain that you are--it does constitute your verbal performance, a performance of a particular kind."[1]

3.2. Happiness of a Performative.

The performatives, according to Austin, have their own kind of peculiarities or faults (in spite of their immunity to falsity). Austin calls these faults "infelicities". An infelicity occurs if ". . . the utterance is unhappy--if certain rules, transparently simple rules, are broken".[2]

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explicit performatives; and there may be nothing in the circumstances by which we can decide whether or not the utterance is performative at all." (How to do Things with Words, pp. 32-33). I take it from this quotation that unless there is a full explicit performative one can't be too sure what performative is being expressed if any at all. This does not rule out the fact that the circumstances may indicate whether one can expect full commitment or not. Therefore with the utterance of an inexplicit (primary) performative one would have to take into account the circumstances before one could expect full commitment.

[1] J. L. Austin, "Performative Utterances," Philosophic Papers, ed. J. O. Urmson and G. J. Warnock (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1961), p. 223.

[2] Austin, H.T.D.T.W.W., pp. 14-15.

Our next problem will now be to discern what these transparently simple rules are. To keep the ledger clear of ambiguities, I shall again quote Austin as to what constitutes a happy performative:

> (A.1) There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances, and further,
>
> (A.2) The particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked.
>
> (B.1) The procedure must be executed by all participants both correctly and
>
> (B.2) completely.
>
> (C.1)[1] Where, as often, the procedure is designed for use by persons having certain thoughts or feelings, or for the inauguration of certain consequential conduct on the part of any participant, then a person participating in and so invoking the procedure must in fact have those thoughts or feelings, and the participants must intend so to conduct themselves, and further
>
> (C.2) Must actually so conduct themselves subsequently.[2]

If one breaks any of the above six rules when uttering a performative, the performative will be unhappy. The main distinction is on the one hand the A's and B's and on the other hand the C's. If one offends against the former group then the performative act is not achieved. In this group, (A's and B's), there is a mistake in

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[1] "C" is used for Austin's gamma.

[2] Austin, "Performative Utterances", p. 224.

the action or convention that disallowed the act. These cases are
different from the C's, in that in the C's the act or procedure
appears to be all right; but the act is only professed and is con-
sidered hollow. The infelicities of A and B are called misfires
and the infelicities under C are called abuses. The acts of A and
B are empty and purported and the acts of C are not consummated or
implemented.

Under the A-B group of misfires there are two groups: A
which are called "misinvocations" and B which are called "misexecu-
tions". One of two things must occur before it can be said that the
infelicity is a misinvocation: one, there does not exist a proced-
ure that can be invoked, or, two, there exists a procedure but it
cannot be applied in a given situation. Austin does not have a name
for the first infelicity, but the second he calls "misapplications".
For a performative to be misexecution it also has to involve one (or
both) of two things: one, flaws in the ceremony, and/or hitches in
the ceremony, Austin calls these infelicities "flaws" and "hitches".
The C's are not discussed by Austin to any great extent and he
simply calls them C.1 insincerities and C.2? (sometimes disloyalties).

The above explanation is laid out graphically as follows:

INFELICITIES


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            AB                                        T

        misfires                                   abuses
 act purported but void              act professed but hollow

          A                    B          C.1              C.2
    misinvocations        misexecution  insincerities   disloyalities?
    act disallowed        act vitiated

A.1          A.2        B.1       B.2
 ?        misapplic-   flaws    hitches                          (1)
            ation
```

3.3. Problems with Infelicities and the Performaive-Constative Distinction.

Austin talks a good deal about the problems of infelicities. Self-criticism in this case is quite effective and Austin discusses three areas: range of application, completeness, and exclusiveness; and he shows how the distinctions break down.

3.31. Range of Application.

In rule A.1 there is a reference to the "uttering of certain words". Austin wants to maintain that infelicities can occur not only for utterances, but for ceremonial acts as well--verbal or non-verbal. He also wants to include certain types of statements (or non-performative utterances). These are the type of statements that are neither true nor false nor obviously contradictory. The classic example is "The present King of France is bald". Perhaps, says Austin, these types of statements are suffering from a certain type

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[1]Austin, H.T.D.T.W.W., p. 18.

of infelicity similar to those which apply to performatives. The infelicity in this case <u>may be</u> the infelicity of being insincere (C.1).

It was first assumed that statements are either true or false and performatives are either happy or infelicitous. Since, however, infelicities can cover such a wide range of not only all conventional ceremonial acts, but all performatives and a certain class of statements as well; the performative-constative distinction breaks down. Austin gives another example of infelicitous statements thereby stressing the untenability of the performative-constative distinction.

The second example of statements that are infelicitous is 'All John's children are bald' where John doesn't have any children. This, according to Austin, is a bit of nonsense, but again a particular kind of nonsense. It is much like the case of the sign saying "This bull is dangerous" when in fact there is no bull. Likewise in a sale of land where the land in question does not exist. In this case the sale is void . . . for a "lack of reference or an ambiguity of reference". Thus 'All John's children are bald' when John doesn't have children, is infelicitous because of a lack of reference. It is not true nor false nor a contradiction, it is simply an infelicity. In a like manner, according to Austin, phrases like "It's raining outside but I don't believe it" and "I promise to be there tomorrow but I don't intend to go" are infelicitous because they are insincere.

3.32. <u>Completeness</u>.

This second problem is concerned with the completeness of
the distinctions of the different types of infelicities. It turns
out according to Austin, that there are other types of infelicity
but they do not affect the six different types of infelicity that
Austin has mentioned. Pretending (sincerity on a stage) for
example, or misunderstanding (as in 'I didn't hear your correctly',
or the use of overly ambiguous words), are not classified as infeli-
cities which affect performatives. In like manner, utterances that
would normally count as infelicities are not infelicities when said
under duress or under extenuating circumstances. So there are
circumstances where a performative would normally be unhappy, but
due to the circumstances one should be aware as to whether the
infelicity is going to count or not, and hence, whether the perform-
ative is valid or not. In a marriage ceremony, then, if the groom
does not say "I do", we can get excited and say "flaw" (or hitch
as the case may be), but with a performance on a stage we know full
well the utterance "I do" is not intended to be a performative and
there could be no infelicities involved.

3.33. <u>Exclusiveness</u>.

The third question deals with the exclusiveness or the indep-
endence of the classifications of infelicities. According to Austin
the distinctions are not independent of each other: there can be two
types of infelicities in one performative ("I insincerely promised
my chair to stop smoking", infelicities A.1 and C.1). The distinctions

are not exclusive in the sense that the way they have of going wrong
or how they shade into one another, seems to be quite arbitrary. That
is, there are no rules saying that any given performative is in any
one class of infelicities rather than in another. One more or less
arbitrarily decides which infelicities are going to count in any one
instance. Thus, according to Austin, when a bishop baptizes a horse,
one isn't sure it's inappropriate because horses are involved or
because baptism only applies to humans. Some dilemma that!

Because of the six infelicities, the indistinctness of the
performative-constative distinction is again brought out. According
to Austin, there are intermediate utterances--utterances that are
partly performative and partly statements. One such example would
be "I am sorry". Is this a performative or a statement reporting
how one feels, like "I am sick"? "I am sorry" partakes of both sides
and one has no way of telling exactly where it should be placed.
There is no independence then between the performatives and the
statements. There are obvious cases where both may apply.

By the same token one is not sure where to place so-called
primary performative utterances like "Hurrah" and "Damn". They appear
to be performatives and seem to be the act of cheering and swearing
respectively. Yet Austin has told us that full commitment to a per-
formative utterance can only come with the explicit performative
utterance, or the circumstances would indicate full commitment.
"Hurrah" and "Damn" may not therefore technically convey any full
performative force.

Austin has a very simple answer to these problems: the per-
formative-constative distinction is untenable.   He says:

> We see then that stating something is perform-
> ing an act just as much as is giving an order
> or giving a warning; and we see, on the other
> hand, that, when we give an order or warning
> or a piece of advice, there is a question
> about how this is related to fact which is not
> perhaps so very different from the kind of
> question that arises when we discuss how a
> statement is related to fact. Well this seems
> to mean that in its original form our distinc-
> tion between the performative and the statement
> is considerably weakened, and indeed breaks
> down.[1]

The way is paved for the introduction of illocutionary forces
as a further development of a special theory to a general theory.

3.4. Illocutionary Forces.

With the breakdown of the performative-constative distinction
Austin starts again at the ground of the problem. Austin has stated
that the performative-constative distinction is a special theory that
leads to a general theory--the theory of illocutionary forces. The
new and more complicated theory takes over and by comparing the general
theory and the specific theory we get five general classes, which,
according to Austin, are illocutionary forces. This in turn will give
us our concept of decision-making.

Austin begins his discussion on illocutionary forces by re-
emphasizing the difference between the explicit performative and the

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[1]Austin, "Performative Utterances", p. 238.

<u>primary performative</u>. In looking for a list of phrases that are pure performatives, Austin found that such a list could be constructed but there evolved a continuum from pure explicit performatives to descriptive statements; with half-performative and half-descriptive phrases in the middle (illustrations: pure explicit, "I apologize"; impure (both) "I am sorry"; descriptive, "I repent"). Austin wants, however, some means to establish that one's utterance is a pure explicit performative. For identifying a pure explicit performative Austin gives us four rules:

(1) Does it make sense to ask 'Did he really?'

(2) Could he be doing the action without uttering the performative?

(3) Could he do it deliberately? Could he be willing to do it?

(4) Could it be literally false that, for example, I criticize when I have said 'I criticize'?[1]

The purpose of these four rules is to aid one in distinguishing an explicit performative utterance from other utterances that may be conceived of as pure performatives. Austin lists two problems that may arise. The first is with polite conversation and ritual phrases such as "I take pleasure in . . .". This type of utterance Austin does not want to include as pure explicit performatives. The other occurs when an individual suits an action to a word, as with Counsel of judges ending their case and saying "I end my case". These

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[1] Austin, <u>H.T.D.T.W.W.</u>, p. 84.

utterances are also <u>not</u> to be included in the pure explicit performative group.

There are, however, Austin admits, some further areas of confusion. At this preliminary stage Austin discusses only three problems, and these very briefly. He exposes Behabitives, Expositives and Verdictives at this point, and later, when he has elucidated more on illocutionary forces, he adds Exercitives and Commissives. These five areas for the moment lie somewhere between performative utterances and descriptive utterances. After Austin has explained illocutionary forces, the five "problems" turn out to be different sorts of illocutionary forces--a sort of a compromise between the special theory of performatives and the general theory of illocutionary forces. I will therefore leave off the discuss on of the Behabitives, etc., until I have exposed Austin's theory of illocutionary forces so as to develop a concept of decision-making.

Suffice it to say that because of the confusion between performative utterances and descriptive utterances hitherto mentioned, and because of the five areas of non-explicit performatives mentioned (Behabitives, etc.), Austin starts again to analyse what it means to say, that to say something is to do something. He says:

> Now let us consider where we stand for a
> moment; beginning with the supposed contrast
> between performative and constative utter-
> ances, we found sufficient indications that
> unhappiness nevertheless seems to characterize
> both kinds of utterances, not merely the per-
> formative; and that the requirement of conform-
> ing or bearing some relation to the facts,

> different in different cases, seems to
> characterize performatives, in addition
> to the requirements that they should be
> happy, similarly to the way which is
> characteristic of supposed constatives.
> Now we failed to find a grammatical
> criterion for performatives, but we thought
> that perhaps we could insist that every
> performative <u>could</u> be in principle put into
> the form of an explicit performative, and
> then we could make a list of the performa-
> tive verbs. Since then we have found, how-
> ever, that it is often not so easy to be
> sure that, even when it is apparently in
> explicit form, an utterance is performative
> or that it is not; and typically anyway, we
> still have utterances beginning 'I state
> that . . .' which seem to satisfy the require-
> ments of being performative, yet which surely
> are the making of statements, and surely are
> essentially true or false.
> It is time to consider a fresh start on
> the problem.[1]

The direction Austin now takes is to clarify the phrase: "to say something is to do something". That is, when we say something there are <u>two</u> actions involved; the action of saying something (<u>per se</u>), and the action performed in saying something. The action of (just) saying something Austin calls a locutionary act.

3.41. <u>Locutionary Acts</u>.

Austin says that to say anything in the full sense of 'say' is to do the following three actions. That is, to say anything is:

> (A.a) always to perform the act of uttering
> certain noises (a phonetic act), and the utter-
> ance is a phone,

> (A.b) always to perform the act of uttering

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[1] Austin, <u>H.T.D.T.W.W.</u>, p. 84.

> certain vocables or word, i.e., noises of
> certain types belonging to _and as_ belonging
> to a certain vocabulary, in a certain con-
> struction, i.e., conforming to _and as_ con-
> forming to a certain grammar, with a certain
> intonation, etc , which it is the act of
> uttering a 'pheme' (as distinct from the
> phememe of linguistic theory); and
>
> (A.c) generally to perform the act of using
> that pheme or its constituents with a certain
> more or less definite 'sense' and a more or
> less definite 'reference' (which together are
> equivalent to 'meaning'). This act we may call
> a 'rhetic' act and the utterance which it is
> the act of uttering a 'rheme'.[1]

Saying something then is completing the three above conditions.
We must utter certain noises, the noises must be words in a given
vocabulary and grammar, and the words must have a certain "sense"
and a certain "reference". These three acts in conjunction form what
Austin calls the "locutionary act". In the performance of any phatic
act one is automatically (but not necessarily) performing a phonetic
act. There also seems to be two ingredients in the phatic act:
vocabulary and grammar. Merely saying the words in any order will
not be sufficient, the words must follow a conventional grammar as
well. For example, 'By John if horse thoroughly the if' is NOT a
phatic act as it doesn't follow the standard grammatical form and
it is only a phonetic act.

In general Austin wants to say that it is by definition
impossible to perform a rhetic act without a "sense and reference".

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[1] Austin, _H.T.D.T.W.W._, pp. 92-93.

He also says there are a few puzzling cases. A good example is
that it is rather difficult to establish where the referent is for
'All triangles have three sides'. Here the referent is not even
vague. All rhetic acts must include a phatic act but the inverse
is not necessarily true (as in the case of repeating something we
have not understood). The pheme is a unit of language and if it is
faulty its fault is being nonsensical or meaningless. The rheme
is a unit of speech and if it is faulty, its fault is being vague
or obscure.

3.42. Illocutionary Acts.

So much for a locutionary act. According to Austin every
time we perform a locutionary act we also perform an illocutionary
act. An illocutionary act indicates the manner in which one is
using the locutionary act. When one utters anything that has
meaning (meaning as in Austin--referring to sense and reference)
it is a locutionary act; the manner in which one uses this locu-
tionary act (asking, appealing, warning, describing, and etc.) is
the illocutionary act.

The problem, says Austin, is to determine in what manner
one is using the locutionary act on any given occasion. It makes
a great difference whether one is asking or demanding or suggest-
ing and it is the illocutionary act that indicates which act one
is doing. This is the doctrine of illocutionary forces and is
explained by Austin in the following way:

> I explained the performance of an act in
> this new and second sense as the perform-
> ance of an 'illocutionary' act, i.e., per-
> formance of an act _in_ saying something as
> opposed to performance of an act _of_ saying
> something; and I shall refer this doctrine
> of the different types of functions of
> language here in question as the doctrine
> of 'illocutionary forces'.[1]

It is important to point out that the occasion of an utter-
ance is of most importance and indeed some words are "explained"
by the context in which they are spoken or the context which they
are "designed to be spoken". The explanation of a word is not to
be confused with the meaning of a word however. Austin wants to
distinguish between meaning and force. Meaning for Austin refers
to the use of the pheme (which is a unit of language) to perform
locutionary acts. A locutionary act is the uttering of a rheme
(the rheme is a unit of speech). In ordinary terms, then, mean-
ing for Austin is the use of language for speech. Force, accord-
ing to Austin, is the use of the locution to perform illocutionary
acts. Force is the use of speech with a certain force.

3.43. Perlocutionary Acts.

A person may, upon the completion of an illocutionary act,
produce certain feelings or emotions or reactions in the person
spoken to. An example would perhaps help illustrate this. Suppose
I say to someone, "Hit him"; the locutionary act is the phrase

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Austin, H)T.D.T.W.W., p. 99.

"Hit him", the illocutionary act is the ordering (or commanding,
as the case may be), and the perlocutionary act is the persuading
of the person that I would accomplish (if he in fact did "Hit him").
It appears that the perlocutionary act is a direct consequence of
the illocutionary act. The illocutionary act may or may not in-
volve a locutionary act (an illocutionary act may be performed by
non-verbal means), but there has to be illocutionary act before
there can be a perlocutionary act.[1] Since perlocutionary acts
are direct consequences of illocutionary acts, Austin finds it
necessary to distinguish when the illocutionary action stops and
when the perlocutionary action starts.

To accomplish this Austin refers us to physical actions.
In physical actions there is a minimum physical act. This is the
amount of action required to make 'it' an action. Normally, says
Austin, when one talks about physical actions, one does not refer
to the minimum physical act. When one refers to a physical act,
one includes the consequence or the intentions (however indefinite)

[1] There is at least one instance, however, where Austin in-
dicates that one may or may not be aware of the perlocutionary
effect that one is bringing off. He says: "For clearly any or al-
most any, perlocutionary act is liable to be brought off, in suf-
ficiently special circumstances, by the issuing, with or without
calculation, (my italics) of any utterance whatsoever, and in part-
icular by a straight forward constative utterance (if there is such
an animal).[2] It appears then, that while talking with say person
P, P may overhear us, and because of what I said some perlocutionary
effect may be brought off by an utterance without any calculation
on my part.

[2] Austin, H.T.D.T.W.W., p. 109.

that one may have in mind. However, says Austin, we do not have

a vocabulary which distinguishes physical acts from consequences

of physical acts. With verbal actions, however, our vocabulary

indicates a break between the act (saying something) and the con-

sequence (which is usually not verbal at all). This break is the

distinction between the illocutionary actions and the perlocutionary

actions. The distinction then between physical acts and acts of

saying something is: in the case of physical acts, the acts and

the consequence are of the same nature so to speak; i.e., one is

not afforded a natural break between the act and the consequence;

and with the acts of saying something one is provided with a

natural break, where one says something and usually the conse-

quence is non-verbal action.

Austin is also quite emphatic that the perlocutionary act

is to be the consequence of the illocutionary act and not the locu-

tionary act.[1] One could go back to the phonetic act and take the

phone as the action of saying something, and then the consequence

would be everything that follows the phonetic act. However Austin

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[1] There is one note of confusion here, however. On page
101 Austin says: "There is yet a further sense in which to perform
a locutionary act, and therein an illocutionary act, (my italics)
may also be to perform an act of another kind." On page 113 of the
same work he says: "It has, of course, been admitted that to per-
form an illocutionary act is necessarily to perform a locutionary
act . . .". The confusion arises on page 118 where he states:
"However this alone is enough to distinguish illocutionary acts,
since we can for example warn or order . . . by non-verbal means
and these are illocutionary acts." In order to remain consistent I
will ignore the statement on page 113 as inconsistent (but possibly
true) with the rest of the book.

is also emphatic that the illocutionary act is <u>not</u> to be considered
as the consequence of the locutionary act or any part of the locu-
tionary act. So it appears to be an act of legislation that Austin
draws the line between the antecedent and consequence as being be-
tween the illocuationary act and the perlocutionary act. Perlocu-
tionary acts are the consequences of illocutionary acts and nothing
else.

There is a second and perhaps more important distinction
between the illocutionary acts and perlocutionary acts. As a means
to distinguish perlocutionary and illocutionary acts, Austin intro-
duces two formulas.[1]

There are the "in" and the "by" formulas. The "in" formula
is to cover illocutionary acts and the "by" formula is to cover
perlocutionary acts. So, "In saying I would hit him, I was threat-
ening him", would be an example of an "in" formula and an illocu-
tionary act (threatening). According to Austin one would not say,
for example, "In saying I would hit him I alarmed him". This is a
perlocutionary act and <u>must</u> be expressed by the formula "By saying
I would him him I alarmed him". Perlocutionary acts cannot be
expressed by the "in" formula and illocutionary acts cannot be
expressed by the "by" formula. If a given action will fit into
the "in" formula, it must therefore be an illocutionary act. The

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[1]Austin, <u>H.T.D.T.W.W.</u>, p. 121.

same holds true for actions that fit into the "by" formula, and they must be perlocutionary acts.

After having discussed the distinctions and differences between the illocutionary act and the perlocutionary act, Austin now discusses the connection between the two acts. He claims there are three main connections. The first is called "uptake". Uptake is the achievement of some effect by the illocutionary act. If there is no achievement, the illocutionary act will be unhappy or unsuccessfully performed. The achievement of the certain effect is not the illocutionary act, but an achievement must come about before the illocutionary act will be happy.

The second connection is called "taking effect". If the consequence of the illocutionary act has taken effect, this means the consequence has taken place in a normal or conventional manner. For example, if I have the authority and I state "I hereby name this ship John Doe", any future reference to this ship by any other name will be out of order. There are conventional acts that take place and these must be done in a normal conventional manner.

The third connection is called "inviting responses". The response that is invited by the uttering of an illocutionary act is not a perlocutionary act in this case. It is a separate action done by the second person involved. Perhaps an example to help illustrate, take: "I ordered him and he obeyed". The 'I ordered

him' is the illocutionary act, and the 'he obeyed' is the response required. The "getting" him to obey (as in 'I got him to obey') is the perlocutionary act. So there must be the the former action or sequel on the part of the second person to make the illocutionary act a happy one.

There are illocutionary acts that have perlocutionary objects and there are illocutionary acts that have perlocutionary sequels. With the perlocutionary object, the person uttering the illocutionary act must have some 'intention in mind' (deterring, persuading, etc.) and what he intends must come about as a result of his illocuationary act. I must have some intention(e.g., I intend to insult him) and he must be insulted before it can be said that a perlocutionary object has taken effect. A perlocutionary sequel is any result that may come about OTHER THAN that result that I may have intended. If I intend to insult someone and he just laughs, the perlocutionary act of amusing him is a perlocutionary sequel as it is not the perlocutionary act that I had intended to bring off.

There are also cases where a perlocutionary object or sequel can be achieved by non-locutionary means. Intimidating one by means of waving a stick is a good example. The waving of the stick may be a warning or it may be a salute, depending on the circumstances. Perlocutionary objects may, then, be achieved by non-verbal means, but this is not in itself sufficient

to distinguish them from illocutionary actions. For illocutionary
acts too may be achieved by non-verbal means; for example, warning
you by waving a stick. Austin is still concerned with the verbal
aspects of the illocutionary forces and I think that one of the
main points that Austin wants to establish is that illocutionary
acts are conventional, and the perlocutionary act is unconven-
tional, i.e , there is not a "laid down" response to the illocu-
tionary act. There are then, three connections between the verbal
actions and the consequences: uptake, taking effect, and inviting
responses, and each perlocutionary act may be a sequel or an
object.

3.5. Problems.

Austin indicates at an early stage (How to Do Things with
Words, pages 104 - 107) that there may be come areas of contention
that will have to be examined. Austin classifies seven such areas.
Some of the difficulties have already been answered in this exposi-
tion (at least answered as far as Austin is concerned), but it may
help elucidate the theory of illocutionary forces to cover all
seven areas.

The first area is concerned with the difference between
"meaning" and "use" of a sentence. For Austin these are not syno-
nyms, and he does not want the distinction between the two blurred.
The difference between "meaning" and "use" (or force) has been
discussed (vide page 52) sufficiently, and the difference between

the two appears to be the difference between locutionary acts and illocutionary acts.

The meaning of a sentence is found out by referring to the "sense and reference" of a locutionary act (rheme) and how one "uses" that meaning is the illocutionary act. By blurring 'use' and 'meaning' one can also blur the distinction between perlocutions and illocutions. As Austin says: "Speaking of the 'use of "language" for arguing or warning' looks just like speaking of 'the use of "language" for persuading, rousing, alarming'; yet the former may, for rough contrast, be said to be <u>conventional</u>, in the sense that at least it could be made explicit by the performative formula; but the latter could not. Thus we can say 'I argue that' or 'I warn you that' but we cannot say 'I convince you that' or 'I alarm you that'."[1] "Use" refers to both perlocutionary acts and illocutionary acts.

The second problem is also concerned with the "<u>use</u>" of language. It appears that the "use" of language can apply to more than just illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. It also covers joking, poetry, and also language that is not, in general, entirely serious. In these instances the normal condition of reference does not apply, and if I said "Go and catch a falling star", I

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[1]Austin, <u>H.T.D.T.W.W.</u>, p. 103.

would not be seriously implying, according to Austin, that you should go and catch a falling star. Therefore no attempt shall be made to place "uses" of this type as either perlocutionary or illocutionary.

As a third problem one should, according to Austin, be aware that there are some things we do in connection with speaking that don't seem to fit into any of the three different categories (locution, illocution, perlocution), or at least one would be confused as to which class the action would fit into. Austin's example is "insinuating". That is, one does not say "I insinuate . . .", rather insinuating comes as a result of an utterance. The formulas "In saying X I was warning him", and "In saying X he was insinuating that . . ." can be used as examples. The "X" in the first example could be considered to be the warning, but the "X" in the second example cannot be considered to be the "insinuation". The "insinuation" is something different and it doesn't ostensibly fit into any one of the three categories.

The fourth problem is that one must allow for ills in the three different actions, in so far as they are actions in the proper sense. As with actions (per se) one has to distinguish between actually doing an action and attempting to do an action with the three (locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary) categories. According to Austin one could expect some infelicities here.

Problem five is concerned with the fact that one can pro-
duce with an utterance consequences that do not come out according
to one's expectations. This is the problem of the perlocutionary
object and the perlocutionary sequel, which Austin, I would sup-
pose, considers explained to a sufficient degree. (Vide above,
page 57.)

The sixth difficulty is that actions which are performed
under duress are not really actions in the full sense. Thus if
someone puts a revolver to my head and makes me make a promise,
it is not really an action in the full sense of "action". Again
Austin seems to have covered this problem by simply stating that
actions done under duress are not to be considered in his doctrine
of illocutionary forces.

The seventh and perhaps most serious problem is that the
notion of 'action' is unclear in perlocutionary acts and illocu-
tionary acts. To solve this problem Austin referred us to
physical actions in an effort to show us the distinction between
physical acts and between illocutionary acts and perlocutionary
acts. In the case of physical actions there is not a clear cut-
off between the action and the consequence. However, in the case
of things we do with words there is a clear cutoff between the
(verbal) illocutionary act and the (non-verbal) perlocutionary
consequence. Again, I think Austin considers this problem solved.

There are, however, those who would not be so eager to accept the doctrine of illocutionary forces in such an amiable manner. Max Black[1] would like to maintain that the real problem is not that of distinguishing between the perlocutionary and the illocutionary acts, but that of distinguishing between the illocutionary and the locutionary acts. Black finds it difficult to comprehend what a locutionary act is to be. According to Black, each locutionary act, in order to be a locutionary act, must also be an illocutionary act: there cannot be an utterance that is not ordering or asking or stating, etc. Therefore, in order to perform a locutionary act, one must necessarily perform an illocutionary act. This, however, according to Black, makes the locutionary act a "dubious abstraction" of the illocutionary act.[2] Since there is a direct correlation between the illocutionary act and the explicit performative, it turns out that any utterance may be interpreted in the direction of a performative.

The above is a worthwhile criticism of Austin's distinctions; however, it is not the purpose of this paper to show that the categories (locution-illocution-perlocution) break down. I feel Austin himself is almost too critical. For the sake of the

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[1]Max Black, "Austin on Performatives", Philosophy, (Vol. XXXVII, July, 1963), p. 217.

[2]Ibid., p. 225.

theory of decision-making, I will assume that Austin, with his doc-
trine of illocutionary forces makes some valid distinctions and
that these distinctions can be used in such a way so as to promote
a theory of decision-making. I would now like to discuss the dif-
ferent types of illocutionary forces that are possible.

3.6. Types of Illocutionary Forces.

After having failed to find a list of pure explicit per-
formative verbs in the special theory, Austin now elucidates on
a list of the illocutionary forces of an utterance in the general
theory. As Austin found out, there is no such thing as simple
pure performative utterances on the one hand, and pure constative
utterances on the other. As well as the two extremes there is a
whole class of utterances that lies somewhere between the two dis-
tinctions. Austin also concedes that there are no distinctions
in the general theory that are mutually exclusive. They are more
like "general families of related speech acts" or "overlapping
speech acts".[1]

Austin suggests five such general classes: (1) Verdict-
ives, (2) Exercitives, (3) Commissives, (4) Behabitives, and (5)
Expositives.[2]

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[1]Austin, H.T.D.T.W.W., p. 149.

[2]Ibid., p. 150.

3.61. <u>Verdictives</u>.

As the name implies these utterances are the passing of judgments, giving verdicts or simply presenting findings. They are, according to Austin, judicial, as opposed to legislative or executive acts. Verdictives are in the realm of what I have called pre-decisional actions (making of judgments, estimates, assessments, etc.), and as Austin says:

> It (the verdictive) is done in virtue of an official position; but it still purports to be correct or incorrect, right or wrong, justifiable or unjustifiable on the evidence. <u>It is not made as a decision in favour or against</u>.[1] (my italics)

I think it is clear here that Austin does not consider the Verdictives as decisions <u>per se</u> and he draws, therefore, a distinction between judgments and decisions. This particular distinction may not be deliberate on his part, but Austin certainly views decision-making as something special, and, I believe, entirely different from judgment making. Austin lists a number of examples of Verdictives: estimate, measure, rate, describe, value, reckon, assess, grade, and many others.[2] I maintain these examples clearly mark varieties of the pre-decisional process.

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[1] <u>Ibid</u>., p. 153.

[2] <u>Ibid</u>., p. 152.

3.62. <u>Exercitives</u>.

Exercitives are the giving of decisions towards or against a certain course of action. Exercitives are distinct from judgments in that the exercitives are decisions that something is <u>to be</u> so rather than judgments that something is so. Or as Austin says, it is a sentence rather than a verdict.[1] I think that one can see that Austin, if he had been asked, would have placed decisions <u>per se</u> or the crucial area of decision-making under Exercitives. Examples that he gives for Exercitives are: choose, sentence, order, pardon, advise, recommend, appoint, grant.[2] Although only the first example given has any direct relationship to decision-making (perhaps the placing of the different words into the different categories is somewhat arbitrary), I feel that Austin has anticipated a different kind of illocutionary force that can easily be molded into a concept of decision-making. But I wish to continue with an exposition of the other types of illocutionary forces so as to afford us with a comparison with Ofstad.

3.63. <u>Commissives</u>.

Again as the name implies, Commissives commit the individual to a specific course of action. There is a good deal of

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[1] <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 154.

[2] <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 155.

overlap between Commissives and the other types of illocution-
ary forces because all types of illocutionary forces imply, to
a certain extent, a given degree of involvement on the part of
the individual. Commissives appear to indicate a different
type of involvement than say the involvement of Verdictives or
Exercitives. Examples given on Commissives include promise,
intend, declare my intention, propose to, shall, agree, bet,
consent.[1] It is interesting to note that Austin includes in-
tentions under Commissives, but he has ignored (naively perhaps)
any _degree_ of intentions that one may have. One simply has
intentions or he doesn't and if he does have intentions then
any utterance or declaration of an intention would be a Commis-
sive. According to Austin, Exercitives commit one to the _conse-_
quence of an action and the Commissive commits one to the _action_.
However, as already noted by Austin, there is a great difficulty
in distinguishing the consequence from the act (physical) and
therefore there are a lot of Commissives that may be placed into
the Exercitive class and vice versa.

3.64. _Behabitives_.

Behabitives are the utterances that denote a reaction to
other people's behaviour or the expression of an attitude of

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[1]Ibid., pp. 156-157.

someone else's conduct. Behabitives are not descriptions of our
attitudes or the venting of our emotions although Behabitives
are closely connected with both of these.[1] They are related to
Commissives in that one has to commit oneself to a certain course
of action in order to react to another person's behaviour. They
are distinct in that the Behabitives refer only to behavioural
reactions. Austin has listed seven general areas where the no-
tion of the Behabitives plays a part: (1) apologies, (2) thanks,
(3) sympathy, (4) attitudes, (5) greetings, (6) wishes, and (7)
challenges.[2] Under each of these areas there are different ex-
pressions that are used, as for example, under number three there
is deplore, congratulate, felicitate and the like.

It would be interesting to see if there is any correla-
tion between insincerity and integration for Austin. Austin seems
to want to say that either you are insincere or you are not.
There does not appear to be a continuum involved in the infelicity
of insincerity. This fact may rule out the possibility of a cor-
relation between the two notions, but nonetheless insincerity
seems to describe the amount of commitment that an individual has
toward a given attitude. There might also be a correlation be-
tween integration and intention as used by Austin. Again there

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[1] Ibid., p. 159.

[2] Ibid.

does not seem to be a continuum involved in intentions and this renders a comparison difficult.

3.65. Expositives.

Expositives appear to be the leftovers and/or the accumulation of the previous four types of illocutionary forces. Thus in clarifying, expounding of views or arguments, we use expositives. Expositives are simply the exposition of any of the above. Austin admits that any one of the four previous types of illocutionary forces can be fitted into the Expositives (as a matter of fact he takes examples from each one), which in itself indicates that this particular distinction is perhaps not even needed. Nonetheless Austin includes Expositives as a separate type of illocutionary force and even given examples of what this "clarifying" process would be. Although the examples are divided into seven separate sections, Austin gives us no specific reason why this is so. Some random examples are: affirm, describe, identify, swear, rejoin, apprise, correct, analyse, define and understand. It appears that any given word may have more than just one illocutionary force involved in it and one should therefore analyse the illocutionary forces of a word before we judge how a word should be used.

3.4. <u>Concept of Decision-Making</u>.

I think the following conclusions may be drawn from the above exposition:

(1) Austin is not explicitly concerned with decision-making.

(2) The boundaries between Austin's five classes of illocutionary acts are so vague that it is difficult to draw any substantial conclusions bearing on a concept of decision-making.

However, in spite of these difficulties, I do wish to draw some basic conclusions that may aid in elucidating the concept of 'decision-making'. Verdictives, as I have already said, are pre-decisional. Austin says quite specifically that Verdictives are <u>not</u> decisions[1] and that Verdictives are to be considered as right or wrong, justifiable or unjustifiable. This would indicate that <u>decisions</u> are not to be considered as right or wrong, justifiable or unjustifiable. It might also follow that decisions are not to be considered as successful or unsuccessful either.

Commissives are clearly post-decisional as Austin maintains that with the use of Commissives one is committed to a specific course of action. Since it involves a commitment to what one is

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[1]<u>Ibid</u>., p. 153

going to do in any conception of decision-making, Commissives must be post-decisional.

As can be seen, there is not any one specific area that one can point to and say there is "decision-making". Since Exercitives involve a commitment to a consequence of an action, and this in turn can be viewed as a commitment to a declaraction of an intention; it seems likely that the decisions per se will be Exercitive. When I say that decision per se is an Exercitive and when I say that decision per se is an achievement, this does not mean that I am committed to saying that all Exercitives are achievements. Clearly one can give good or bad advice. But if one is to find a decision per se at all, it will more likely be an Exercitive than anything else.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSIONS

4.   In order to aid us in comparing the two philosophers, I
will first give a short summation of each.

4.1. Summation of Ofstad.

Ofstad has indicated there are only two processes involved
in decision-making. There is the "act of deciding" which he con-
siders to be synonymous with "decision itself", and there is a
"process of deciding" which precedes and leads up to the "decision"
or "action". That is, he analyses decisions as involving pre-
decisional and decisional processes or actions. For it to be said
that a decision has taken place there has to be (1) a sign that a
certain amount of deliberation has taken place between at least
two alternatives that the agent is aware of, and (2) the agent must
be motivated towards his choice. There are at least two types of
decisions possible: successful and stable. There are only success-
ful or unsuccessful decisions whereas there is a continuum in
stable decisions from maximum stable to maximum unstable. Integra-
tion and inner resistance appear to affect the stability of a deci-
sion. So as to make sense of the concepts 'successfulness' and

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'decision itself.' I suggested that "successfulness" should refer to post-decisional activity and that "decision itself" refer to something between the pre-decisional process and the post-decisional process.

Decision-making for Ofstad involves a commitment on the part of the agent, a commitment involving his entire personality-- that is, if the decision is stable, highly integrated and in a conflict situation. According to Ofstad a person can make a decision just as easily as he can speak, but it will be only a minor decision and it will not be a decision, that is stable, high-integrated, and in a conflict situation. Integrated decisions (that is decisions to which the agent is committed) are of importance to Ofstad as there are some decisions that it is not in one's power to make. These are the decisions that go against one's personality (the inner resistance is too high?). The decision has to be integrated into one's personality before one can produce a decision of this type.

4.2. Summation of Austin.

As can be seen, an extrapolation of a notion of 'decision-making' from Austin can only come after one has fully understood what Austin means by "illocutionary force". To arrive at the doctrine of illocutionary force Austin first showed that the performative-constative distinction broke down. The range of application

of the performative-constative distinction was too broad (it included all conventional acts); the distinction was _too_ complete (infelicities are involved in all types of actions), and lastly the types of infelicities were not mutually exclusive. All these problems promoted the downfall of the distinction and Austin found that there was not simply performatives on one hand and constatives on the other Thus Austin expounded on a more general theory of related speech acts. He got locutionary acts (phemes--referring to sense and reference), illocutionary acts (that which we do _in_ uttering something--ordering, asking, etc.), and perlocutionary acts (that which we do _by_ uttering something--persuading, amusing, etc.). I construe decision-making as illocutionary and I argue that pre-decisional processes, post-decisional processes, and perhaps decisions _per se_ will be located within three of Austin's five types of illocutionary force.

Verdictives are an example of pre-decisional processes as one is concerned with the passing of judgments, etc. The Verdictives are clearly specified by Austin to be non-decisional and are to be considered as justifiable, right, wrong, and the like. I take it from this that decisions (_per se_) are not to be considered right or wrong or justifiable. Again from this it might follow that decisions _per se_ are not successful or unsuccessful either. If one is to find decisions _per se_ in Austin's doctrine, they would, in all likelihood, be Exercitives.

One argument for not placing decisions _per se_ under Exercitives is that Exercitives are _acts_--illocutionary _acts_. Since decisions _per se_ for me are not to be conceived of as actions, it is difficult to claim that Austin can be viewed of as agreeing with my distinctions. Austin does however claim a difference between judgments and decisions and perhaps decisions _per se_ are not to be specifically classed in the doctrine of illocutionary force. Decisions _per se_ would simply be a type of involvement that is somewhat like the involvement of Exercitives.

Commissives however are clearly examples of post-decisional processes. For an utterance to be a Commissive one has to be committed to an action.

If we assume that decisions _per se_ could be classed somehow as an Exercitive or a type of Exercitive force, one could not, for Austin, use the word 'decision' without being involved in that type of illocutionary force. That is, barring an infelicity one would have to have made a decision if one used the word 'decision' in the context of an Exercitive. With an infelicity involved (for example, insincerity) the illocutionary force would be void and a decision would not have been made.

4.3. Comparison of Ofstad and Austin.

Ofstad views decision-making as a series of actions. The process of deciding leads to the act of deciding and since

decisions can be successful or unsuccessful, decision is not to

be considered as an "achievement" word. Austin does not say

"decision" is a "success" word, but at least he indicates that

decisions are not successful (justifiable). I contend that

Austin's concept and my interpretation of Ofstad are closely

aligned; that an "act of decision" must include three areas.

There must be a pre-decisional process, a decision per se, and

a post-decisional process. Austin does not view decision-making

as a commissive, as I am sure Ofstad would. Decision-making

would definitely entail an involvement on the part of the agent

for Aust n, but not the type of involvement that is entailed in

using Commissives. A promise would be a Commissive but decisions

are a commitment to the consequence of an action, not the action.

Barring an infelicity Austin could not make a decision that did

not have any illocutionary force to it. Ofstad could make a

decision that didn't involve him in any way--it would simply be

a minor decision. (It is perhaps incorrect to state there would

be no involvement and yet still be a decision for Ofstad. Since

there has to be some amount of motivation before it can be said

a decision has taken place, it would be more correct to state

that there could be very little (but not zero) involvement on

Ofstad's part and still be a decision.) It appears that Austin

would either have to make a decision or he does not, whereas

Ofstad would allow for all types of decisions. That is, there

appears to be a dochotomy for Austin concerning decisions, (that is, one either makes a decision or he does not; and a continuum involved in decisions for Ofstad (from minor to major decisions)).

So far I have discussed two areas of (in)compatibility: (1) the difference in their views on decisions _per se_ and (2) the difference in their views on the dichotomy-continuum question.

There remains at least one other question: what is to be considered as an "act of decision". For Ofstad the "act of decision" is simply the decision itself or an action that comes about as a result of a process of decision. The best that can be offered for Austin is my extrapolation of him and it would appear that there are three areas involved in decision-making; a decision _per se_, a pre-decisional process and a post-decisional process. As I have pointed out, Ofstad may justifiably be interpreted in this direction as well, but only after some serious changes.

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